

Subnational

IGR informer



The IGR
Initiative

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**Subnational IGR expansion
in Nigeria has not reduced
poverty**

About The IGR Initiative

The IGR Initiative supports subnational governments in improving their internally generated revenue through research, consultancy engagements and capacity building. The Initiative holds regular webinars, debates and ideation sessions with the public and practitioners to reinforce learning, innovation, reform actions, and advocacy that help strengthen the entire IGR expansion process and for all stakeholders at the sub-national level. It is a registered trademark of Citizens Collective Finance Expansion Ltd/GTE.

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Subnational IGR expansion in Nigeria has not reduced poverty

By

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Summary: Multidimensional poverty increases as state governments expand their IGR by 30% on a 10-year annual average growth rate. The human development index also exhibits an inadequate response growing by about 0.86% for every 1% increase in subnational IGR [the driver]. Are citizens receiving value for their tax compliance? Sadly, subnational IGR wastage grows at approximately a 15.3% rate.

IGR receipts and citizens' well-being

Governments exist to guarantee the well-being of their citizens. Good governance, thence, means satisfying this well-being expectation. Trusting that those controlling the statecraft can provide them with the expected 'good governance', citizens entrust them with a share of their earnings as taxes. Therefore, in some sense, tax payments and other compulsory financial obligations to the government represent prices citizens pay in exchange for their well-being. As markedly rational economic agents, they are interested in maximizing their value aspirations. In essence, the more governments strive to expand their internally generated revenue by ensuring maximum compliance from them, the more the citizens require equal or more marginal units of well-being for each unit increase of such payments. There is a conjured feeling of the government robbing its citizens when they do not receive the quantum of well-being corresponding to their payments. An excellent way to understand this situation better is to determine whether increasing rates of IGR receipts are consistent with improvements in citizens' well-being. Analysts have relied on measures of the quality of human development, prosperity, multidimensional poverty, and ease of doing business, among others, to appreciate the level of general well-being or its substructure of good governance.

Aside from being reasonable, it is incontrovertible that citizens trust governments that adequately address health, business growth, income generation, and education more than one that pays scant attention to these human development indicators. Specifically, more economic activities will likely surge when the government performs credibly in providing public goods, including solid business-supporting infrastructure, security strengthening and improving the justice system. These manifestations of good governance drive employment, output and income growth and reinforce other prosperity-enriching factors. It is a no-brainer, therefore, that the more success the government achieves in enthroning good governance, the lower the incidences of poverty, and the higher the citizens' trust, other things being equal.


Citizens' trust is critical for tax compliance

90%
of subnationals
perform poorly
on tax process
digitalization

Tax evasion is interpretable as a form of protest against the government's inability to win citizens' trust. A theoretical albeit logical assumption is that the higher the tax evasion, the less the citizens trust their government. In addition to the provision of public goods by the subnational government, the quality of tax administration by the Internal Revenue Service can also be a contributing factor. All tax administrative processes infringing on the cost, convenience, and fairness principles detract from taxpayers' trust in the government. Conversely, the IRS's administrative efficiency and effectiveness fortify citizens' trust and raise the level of taxpayer compliance. Taxpayers want to comply at the least possible cost without incurring unexpected inconveniences. And since technological adaptation and tax payment process digitalization best engender convenience and reduction of compliance costs, governments performing sub-optimally in process automation are more likely culprits. Sadly, more than 90% of subnational governments in Nigeria fall within this category. Therefore, benchmarking the IRS's poor performance in technology adaptation and their parent governments' weakness in the provision of public goods, ease of doing business, and the quality of human development against their internally generated revenue increases make the question of citizens' trust resonate.

We can, albeit simplistically, rely on proxy metrics such as the IGR-to-GDP ratio and the annual average growth rates [AAGR] of IGR to make sense of the efficiency of revenue collection agencies and the citizens' compliance rates. The higher the IGR-to-GDP ratio, the more efficient revenue collection agencies are at pressing out tax and non-tax revenue compliance from economic agents, other things being equal. It indicates the proportion of internally generated revenue from the earned income of the economic agents in a State. On the other hand, the faster the rate of expansion in the IGR, the more efficient the revenue collection agencies would likely be, and perhaps the more compliant the citizens. A 10-year annual average growth rate gives a sense of the long-run pace of expansion in the IGR. Putting the two indicators together, we outline the States with the fastest expanding IGR, the most compliant taxpayers and the most efficient administrations. See figure 1.

Figure 1: Scatterplot of IGR AAGR versus IGR-to-GDP



Eleven States, or 30% of State governments in Nigeria, fall within quadrant B, comprising those growing annually by at least 15%, on average and collecting 1% or more of their total economic output as tax and non-tax payments. Jigawa, Ebonyi, Ogun, Kwara, Enugu, Oyo, Lagos, Plateau, Kaduna, Borno, and Nasarawa States are within the quadrant. Quadrant A comprises States growing speedily but not collecting up to 1% of their total economic output in revenue. Members of quadrant D, the two States leading in oil production in Nigeria, mobilize more than 1.2% of their States' economic output as IGR but are not growing by up to 15%. Members of quadrant C are the worst performers. It is reasonable to expect that members of quadrant B and, to a lesser extent, quadrant D should provide comparably more well-being to their citizens than those in quadrant C.


30%
of state
governments' IGR
grow annually by
>15% since 2011
and also $\geq 1\%$
share of the state
GDP

Rapid IGR expansions have not improved citizens' welfare

Let us assume that State governments in Nigeria equally redistribute all the IGR collected to their citizens. Figure 2 shows State governments' categorization based on their growth rates of IGR mobilization [AAGR], the proportion of the State economy's real output taken as government revenue and what each citizen gets if these collected revenues are redistributed [IGR per capita]. We standardized the three variables for consistency such that their averages equal zero. See figure 2.

21 states
are below average
on IGR collection
and distribution

Figure 2: State membership of clusters based on collection and distributional efficiency




The IGR per capita dimension automatically categorizes States into three groups. Lagos state government is by several multiples the best performer on the IGR per capita indicator. Members of clusters two and three [see figure 2] are slightly above-average performers in the second category. Members of cluster four are the worst performers. They performed below average on all three dimensions used in this analysis. Although the Lagos state government's rate of IGR growth is below the national average, it is nevertheless a more than-average performer in collection efficiency using the IGR-TO-GDP ratio criterion. Expectedly, none of the members of quadrant B in figure 1 are in cluster four in figure 2. Figure 2 shows that State governments quickly growing their IGR as well as reasonably efficient in their collection are more likely to be above-average performers in sharing the welfare derivable from it. On the flip side, quadrant C [figure 1] States such as Benue, Cross River, Yobe, and Abia are critically below-average performers on the IGR per capita indicator.

Approximately 58.3% of the States in Nigeria fall below the average on IGR per capita measure. Surprisingly, virtually all the states in quadrant A with more than 20% annual rate of growth of their IGR, such as Ekiti, Sokoto, Zamfara, Ondo, Taraba, Kogi, Bauchi and Kano [see figure 1], all fall within cluster four [see figure 2] consisting of States not doing averagely well on the IGR per capita measure. This finding raises the question of how well the solid 10-year average growth has impacted their citizens' well-being, assuming we share all revenue collected.



Figure 3: Nigerian States HDI - 2019



IGR growth may not be a great driver of HDI

Aside from solid leadership, good governance depends on the adequacy of revenue. Money gives ideas their desired wings. Consistent with that expectation, apart from the North Central zone with weak albeit positive association [44.1% correlation coefficient], there is a reasonably strong positive correlation between the IGR of 36 State governments and the average human development index [HDI] using data between 2011 and 2019. See Table 1. In fact, for the southeast geopolitical zone, there seems to be a very strong association between the two variables.

Table 1: Relationship between HDI and IGR

Geopolitical Zones & National	Association strength	HDI [10-yr Av. annual growth rate]	IGR growth rate	Unproductive revenue growth	% change in HDI with a 1% change in IGR
NC	44.1%	1.0%	16.7%	15.7%	0.51%
NE	77.8%	1.8%	13.8%	12.0%	0.85%
NW	75.4%	1.4%	22.9%	21.5%	0.82%
SE	86.4%	1.8%	14.8%	13.0%	0.88%
SS	76.3%	1.3%	14.1%	12.8%	0.84%
SW	75.8%	1.1%	18.2%	17.1%	0.83%
National	77.4%	1.4%	16.7%	15.3%	0.86%


15.3%
is the growth rate
of subnational IGR
wastage

But between 2011 and 2019, the human development index [HDI] grew at an annual average growth rate [AAGR] below 2%, while the IGR of subnational governments grew by more than 13% for the same period. Suppose we assume correctly that a substantial [over 90%] of government reason-for-being is to guarantee and improve the well-being of its citizens. In that case, the difference between the IGR and HDI growth rates indicates the size of governments' unproductive or diverted revenue. Table 1 shows that this is quite large, with the Northwest occupying the topmost position. Again, the percentage increase in subnational HDI with every 1% change in the IGR shows that it is less than 1% in all 36 States. This inelasticity of HDI to IGR has grave implications as a driver of citizens' well-being, producing less than proportionate change in the outcome variable.

Poverty may be growing with IGR expansion

Good governance should manifest in minimizing poverty and the deprivation of basic needs. The multidimensional poverty window is the flip view of the human development index. Both indices facilitate our understanding of how well the government has performed on its duty of enhancing citizens' well-being. We expect that subnational governments growing very quickly in the past ten years on their IGR mobilization should have used the same to tame the incidences of poverty. We also expect the same for State governments collecting 1% or more of their citizens' total output as revenue. Contrary to our expectations, multidimensional poverty in Nigeria appears to be positive, albeit weakly correlated with the annual average growth rates of the IGR of subnational governments in Nigeria. Figure 4 shows multidimensional poverty increases as subnational governments expand their revenue intakes.

Figure 4: Scatterplot of multidimensional poverty and annual average growth rate of IGR



Multidimensional poverty
decreases by a paltry


-0.03%

for every 1% increase in
the IGR-to-GDP ratio

Again, virtually all the States with more than 50% multidimensional poverty headcount ratio have been growing their internally generated revenue at an annual rate exceeding 10%. See the cluster in the serrated area within the chart. In contrast, the top five States with the least poverty headcount ratio, namely Ondo, Abia, Lagos, Anambra and Edo States, have been growing their internally generated revenue below the national average growth rate in the past ten years.

On the other hand, there is an extremely weak negative correlation between multidimensional poverty and the IGR-to-GDP ratio. See figure 5. Regression estimates show that States' multidimensional poverty decrease by a paltry -0.03% for every 1% increase in the IGR-to-GDP ratio. This highly inelastic response strongly questions the purpose of the so-called IGR expansion efficiency.

Figure 5: Scatterplot of multidimensional poverty and IGR-to-GDP ratio



Growing IGR and citizens' well-being is possible and worthwhile

Our exegesis so far reveals a seeming unwillingness to foster the natural symbiosis that should exist between IGR growth and citizens' well-being. The more citizens benefit from employment, increased income, and the availability of social amenities and other public goods that support entrepreneurship, the more they are able and willing to contribute to the growth of the IGR. Therefore, forward-looking State governors and local government chairpersons adopt the continuous reinvestment model practised by entrepreneurs to ensure that the IGR continues to grow without smothering the goose that lays the golden egg. The sustainable development goals, or the State's long-term development plan, provide good frameworks guiding leaders of subnational governments in prioritizing the IGR plough-back schemes. Accordingly, upon determining the size of re-investable IGR in programs and projects in the States, unique priorities based on the sustainable development goals or the development plan help decide their annual distribution in approved budgets across the chosen areas to deliver expected outcomes.


Other things being equal, the resulting revenue inflow due to the plough-back will depend on the time to return on impactful government spending. Those capital expenditures with short-term upsides say the creation of some markets

will automatically result in immediate revenue intakes. Plough backs on projects with medium to long-term time to return on investment periods, such as flyovers, schools and bridges, will also have delayed revenue yield. Overall, consistent reinvestment of the IGR will also continuously expand the subnational government's non-tax and tax revenue bases. One significant challenge affecting this is political leaders' rampant revenue diversion into private pockets. The second is the choice of projects and programs with extremely weak revenue-yielding impacts. For instance, giving out a loan of N20,000.00 to 200,000 supposedly poor people to start a business might look good but will likely result in losing the entire amount. Apart from N20,000.00 being grossly inadequate to successfully create and sustain any meaningful business, even at the micro level, many recipients might not have learned how to do business.

Although, when conducted properly, these deliberate streams of IGR plough backs should improve the ease of doing business, the government must also have a well-oiled tracking and strategy fine-tuning mechanism to ensure its consistent actualization. The better the environment for business, the more likely the quantum of entrepreneurial activities and income earnable by the State. Figure 6 shows the performance of the States on investment promotion and capital importation.



Figure 6: Investment promotion and capital importation




The 2021 edition of the ease of doing business in Nigeria by the Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council [PEBEC] presents States' scores [ranging between zero and 10] on the investment promotion subcomponent of Transparency and Accessibility to Information. State governments with very high scores include Gombe [9.4], Jigawa [9.3], Sokoto [8.7] and Bauchi [7.9]. Even Lagos state, with a very high capital importation ranking, scored 6.4. The colour shading, however, shows that many States with excellent investment promotion scores have low or no capital importation between 2019 and 2021. Specifically, States like Jigawa, Bayelsa, Ebonyi, Gombe and Kebbi all have more than average score on investment promotion but has recorded no capital importation over the three years [2019 – 2021]. The seeming mismatch suggests missing links between the initiatives the States adopt for investment promotion and the investment activities on the ground proxied by capital importation. Consider a State like Abia, categorized as medium-level in capital importation and with a score of 2.5 for the investment promotion programs of the government. That is the case of “the spirit being willing, but the body is weak”. Thus, while the entrepreneurs are massively investing [elevated capital importation level], the government, on the other hand, is not doing enough to incentivize them.

What is the way forward?

Governors and the chairpersons of local governments must prioritize the well-being of their citizens because it is core to the social contract. Given the rule of law and robust private property rights protection, achieving that does not depend on the magnitude but on the quality of spending on programs and projects with high prosperity creation levers. For instance, not all rural roads create significant market access equally. Some will be far more impactful than others. At the same time, some may be an outright waste of resources. That applies to all projects and programs embarked upon by any government. The degree of impact of programs and projects on the entrepreneurial expansion and the welfare of citizens within should determine those prioritized in the expenditure items portfolio.

Citizens paying for this well-being through compliance with various government-imposed rates, levies and taxes must ensure they receive justified value for their money. There needs to be a penalty for such failure by government functionaries. Typically, civil society organizations champion legitimate protestations in this respect, compelling government to be more accountable and pursue its purpose, ensuring that the citizens conduct their economic enterprises in conducive environments. Unfortunately,

while the law easily bends in favour of the government going after non-compliant taxpayers, the same law and its implementation mechanisms drag their feet in compelling the government and those running them to deliver expected well-being impacts. Civil society organizations need to pressure political office-holders, and civil servants in strategic roles to only make justifiably and socioeconomically impactful expenditures. Perhaps, designing such a socioeconomic impact evaluation tool to guide subnational government expenditure and defining acceptable thresholds for them might be helpful and underscore the future of activism. It will also be the surest bet for the government to gain citizens' trust and compliance.



Data Section

Table 2: Internally Generated Revenue [N' Billions]

State2	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Abia	4.34	5.95	11.12	11.76	16.75	12.51	12.37	13.35	12.69	14.92	14.83	15.50	15.92	19.58
Adamawa	2.56	3.87	4.21	4.12	4.62	4.15	4.99	4.45	5.79	6.20	6.20	9.70	8.33	13.01
Akwalbom	11.46	9.25	10.13	11.68	13.52	15.40	15.68	14.79	23.27	15.96	24.21	35.50	30.70	31.40
Anambra	5.98	6.42	7.66	6.15	7.60	8.73	10.45	14.79	15.24	17.37	19.31	26.37	28.01	30.92
Bauchi	2.51	2.43	3.40	4.46	4.06	4.94	4.85	5.39	8.68	4.37	9.69	12.29	13.04	17.90
Bayelsa	3.12	3.04	4.71	3.66	4.96	10.50	10.96	8.71	7.91	12.52	13.64	16.34	12.18	13.27
Benue	4.72	4.52	6.88	11.13	8.44	8.37	8.28	7.63	9.56	12.40	11.22	17.18	10.46	12.60
Borno	2.38	1.99	2.11	2.28	2.44	2.13	2.76	3.53	2.68	4.98	6.52	8.18	11.81	18.74
CrossRiver	6.45	7.11	7.87	9.16	12.73	12.00	15.74	13.57	14.78	18.10	17.55	22.60	16.36	22.91
Delta	15.93	20.82	26.09	34.75	45.57	50.21	42.82	40.81	44.06	51.89	58.44	64.68	59.73	80.20
Ebonyi	1.94	5.00	2.09	2.30	8.23	10.43	11.03	0.00	2.34	5.10	6.14	9.82	15.90	13.75
Edo	4.48	6.97	10.65	14.76	18.88	18.90	17.02	19.12	23.04	25.34	28.43	35.23	28.02	42.43
Ekiti	1.43	1.46	1.55	2.49	3.79	2.34	3.46	3.30	2.99	4.97	6.47	15.37	10.56	13.62
Enugu	6.50	9.49	8.82	7.29	12.21	20.20	19.25	18.08	14.24	22.04	22.15	31.14	23.64	26.72
Gombe	2.79	2.80	2.95	3.15	3.72	3.87	5.20	4.78	2.94	5.27	7.34	6.83	8.64	10.56
Imo	4.19	5.05	5.71	5.81	6.81	7.58	8.12	5.47	5.87	6.85	14.88	6.18	7.67	12.75
Jigawa	0.62	1.39	1.24	1.48	7.88	9.76	6.27	5.08	3.54	6.65	9.25	12.93	20.66	16.49
Kaduna	7.61	8.34	11.56	9.78	11.53	10.93	12.78	11.54	23.02	26.53	29.45	44.96	50.77	52.86
Kano	4.27	4.91	6.62	6.62	11.05	17.14	13.66	13.61	30.96	42.42	44.11	40.59	31.82	40.40
Katsina	2.11	0.00	3.15	4.24	5.03	6.85	6.22	5.79	5.55	6.03	6.96	8.50	11.38	12.04
Kebbi	3.60	4.50	3.81	4.47	5.42	3.73	3.83	3.59	3.13	4.39	4.88	7.37	13.78	9.86
Kogi	1.46	1.98	2.22	2.85	3.19	5.02	6.57	6.78	9.57	11.24	11.33	17.20	17.46	23.41
Kwara	16.56	6.20	7.30	8.82	11.32	13.84	12.46	7.18	17.25	19.64	23.05	30.64	19.62	26.96
Lagos	156.09	177.88	149.97	202.76	219.20	236.20	276.16	268.22	302.43	333.97	382.18	646.61	660.00	753.46
Nasarawa	0.86	1.24	1.85	4.13	4.13	4.01	4.09	4.28	3.40	6.17	7.57	14.53	16.08	20.67
Niger	2.53	2.86	3.26	3.79	3.78	4.12	5.74	5.98	5.88	6.52	10.43	13.60	10.52	16.22
Ogun	5.35	6.74	7.92	10.84	12.44	13.78	17.50	34.60	72.98	74.84	84.55	81.42	50.56	100.73
Ondo	3.98	3.75	6.48	8.02	10.15	10.50	11.72	10.10	8.68	10.93	24.79	30.14	24.85	30.83
Osun	5.35	6.74	3.38	7.40	5.02	7.28	8.51	34.60	72.98	74.84	84.55	81.42	50.56	100.73
Oyo	8.80	14.43	10.49	8.92	14.60	15.25	16.31	15.66	18.88	22.45	24.64	26.59	38.04	52.09

State2	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Plateau	2.74	3.13	3.40	4.52	6.93	8.49	8.28	6.94	9.19	10.79	12.73	16.48	19.12	21.43
Rivers	35.06	37.00	49.63	52.71	66.28	87.91	89.11	82.10	85.29	89.48	112.78	169.60	117.19	123.35
Sokoto	3.35	5.30	3.89	4.19	4.31	5.51	5.62	6.22	4.55	9.02	18.76	19.01	11.80	23.76
Taraba	1.51	1.71	1.28	2.87	3.42	3.34	3.80	4.16	5.90	5.76	5.97	6.53	8.11	9.63
Yobe	1.22	2.12	5.96	2.39	1.79	3.07	3.07	2.25	3.24	3.60	4.38	8.50	6.81	8.46
Zamfara	1.34	2.23	2.07	1.71	2.59	3.04	3.15	2.74	4.78	6.02	8.21	15.42	18.50	18.98

Source: NBS

Table 3: Annual Rate of Growth of IGR, IGR-to-GDP ratio, IGR per Capita and Multidimensional Poverty Incidence [%]

States	Annual Average Growth Rate of IGR ¹	IGR-to-GDP ratio	IGR per Capita	Multidimensional Poverty Incidence %
Abia	6.5%	0.48	3,956.72	29.8
Adamawa	13.2%	0.49	2,649.29	68.7
Akwa Ibom	14.0%	0.4	4,831.68	71.3
Anambra	14.7%	0.49	4,002.99	32.1
Bauchi	23.3%	0.68	2,310.38	73.9
Bayelsa	15.5%	0.4	7,061.01	88.5
Benue	9.8%	0.3	1,888.94	75
Borno	25.6%	1.26	3,560.07	72.5
Cross River	12.4%	0.56	5,126.30	75.4
Delta	11.9%	1.3	12,112.34	47.6
Ebonyi	40.3%	1.16	7,848.56	78
Edo	15.1%	0.97	7,976.59	35.4
Ekiti	30.9%	0.75	4,599.89	36
Enugu	15.3%	1.84	5,213.24	63.1
Gombe	16.1%	0.5	2,763.86	86.2
Imo	16.2%	0.27	3,226.81	40.7
Jigawa	54.2%	1.94	6,234.59	84.3
Kaduna	18.2%	1.22	5,466.52	73.9
Kano	24.3%	0.97	2,636.15	66.3
Katsina	14.1%	0.73	2,661.82	72.7
Kebbi	13.8%	0.55	1,901.27	82.2
Kogi	25.3%	0.46	3,233.30	61.3
Kwara	20.5%	1.93	7,189.53	48.3
Lagos	17.1%	1.33	37,095.33	29.4
Nasarawa	31.1%	1.11	7,060.91	60.7
Niger	18.2%	0.35	2,405.69	69.1
Ogun	33.7%	1.56	12,702.73	68.1
Ondo	19.8%	0.73	6,885.28	27.2
Osun	58.1%	0.95	3,957.83	40.7
Oyo	17.6%	1.43	5,612.21	48.7
Plateau	19.6%	1.43	4,456.73	84
Rivers	10.7%	1.78	16,332.83	62.4
Sokoto	26.9%	0.83	4,092.16	90.5
Taraba	23.5%	0.48	2,755.63	79.4
Yobe	12.3%	0.78	2,156.06	83.5
Zamfara	26.3%	0.75	2,446.53	78

Source: NBS [2021]

Table 4: Human Development Index

State	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Abia	0.565	0.556	0.567	0.575	0.594	0.607	0.616	0.621	0.633	0.641	0.65
Adamawa	0.442	0.444	0.464	0.482	0.51	0.509	0.504	0.495	0.49	0.482	0.488
Akwa Ibom	0.56	0.558	0.577	0.593	0.62	0.62	0.617	0.61	0.609	0.605	0.613
Anambra	0.58	0.582	0.604	0.624	0.656	0.659	0.66	0.656	0.659	0.659	0.668
Bauchi	0.337	0.338	0.352	0.365	0.386	0.395	0.403	0.408	0.417	0.424	0.429
Bayelsa	0.53	0.537	0.563	0.586	0.62	0.629	0.635	0.636	0.643	0.647	0.655
Benue	0.485	0.482	0.498	0.511	0.535	0.551	0.564	0.574	0.589	0.601	0.609
Borno	0.335	0.352	0.381	0.41	0.447	0.463	0.476	0.486	0.5	0.51	0.517
Cross River	0.548	0.539	0.55	0.559	0.578	0.587	0.594	0.596	0.605	0.611	0.619
Delta	0.576	0.571	0.587	0.601	0.625	0.635	0.641	0.644	0.653	0.658	0.667
Ebonyi	0.493	0.484	0.495	0.502	0.522	0.533	0.543	0.548	0.559	0.567	0.575
Edo	0.596	0.591	0.607	0.62	0.644	0.643	0.639	0.631	0.629	0.624	0.632
Ekiti	0.585	0.58	0.595	0.608	0.633	0.631	0.627	0.619	0.617	0.611	0.619
Enugu	0.53	0.524	0.539	0.552	0.576	0.591	0.603	0.611	0.626	0.637	0.645
Gombe	0.41	0.402	0.409	0.414	0.427	0.425	0.421	0.414	0.411	0.407	0.412
Imo	0.554	0.549	0.563	0.576	0.599	0.611	0.62	0.625	0.636	0.644	0.653
Jigawa	0.329	0.326	0.337	0.345	0.362	0.374	0.384	0.391	0.402	0.409	0.415
Kaduna	0.506	0.505	0.524	0.539	0.565	0.557	0.546	0.531	0.522	0.509	0.516
Kano	0.422	0.42	0.433	0.445	0.467	0.472	0.475	0.474	0.479	0.48	0.487
Kastina	0.341	0.338	0.348	0.356	0.372	0.391	0.408	0.42	0.437	0.45	0.456
Kebbi	0.355	0.347	0.353	0.357	0.369	0.363	0.357	0.347	0.342	0.334	0.339
Kogi	0.565	0.558	0.572	0.583	0.606	0.599	0.589	0.575	0.567	0.555	0.563
Kwara	0.548	0.555	0.583	0.608	0.645	0.633	0.617	0.598	0.585	0.568	0.576
Lagos	0.637	0.625	0.634	0.64	0.656	0.664	0.668	0.668	0.674	0.677	0.686
Nasarawa	0.507	0.5	0.513	0.523	0.545	0.553	0.558	0.561	0.569	0.573	0.581
Niger	0.435	0.439	0.459	0.478	0.507	0.504	0.499	0.491	0.488	0.482	0.488
Ogun	0.536	0.532	0.547	0.56	0.585	0.604	0.621	0.633	0.652	0.667	0.675
Ondo	0.573	0.563	0.574	0.582	0.601	0.605	0.606	0.604	0.607	0.607	0.615
Osun	0.613	0.605	0.62	0.631	0.655	0.649	0.64	0.627	0.621	0.611	0.619
Oyo	0.559	0.552	0.565	0.576	0.597	0.606	0.613	0.615	0.623	0.628	0.637
Plateau	0.509	0.501	0.512	0.52	0.539	0.546	0.551	0.552	0.558	0.562	0.569
Rivers	0.569	0.569	0.588	0.604	0.631	0.637	0.639	0.638	0.642	0.644	0.653
Sokoto	0.329	0.324	0.333	0.34	0.355	0.353	0.349	0.343	0.34	0.336	0.34
Taraba	0.441	0.435	0.446	0.455	0.474	0.481	0.486	0.488	0.495	0.499	0.506
Yobe	0.327	0.313	0.31	0.305	0.303	0.319	0.332	0.342	0.354	0.363	0.368
Zamfara	0.327	0.324	0.333	0.34	0.356	0.369	0.381	0.39	0.404	0.414	0.42

Source: Global Data Hub

Table 5: Capital Importation and Investment Promotion

States	Capital Importation (2019-2021) - US\$m	Investment Promotion	Capital Importation Categorized
Abia	56.08	2.51	Medium
Adamawa	25.02	5.16	Low
Akwa-Ibom	1.85	4.66	Low
Anambra	14.92	7.68	Low
Bauchi	0.1	7.88	Low
Bayelsa	0	7.6	None
Benue	25.03	6.69	Low
Borno	0.5	0.54	Low
Cross River	25.85	4.87	Low
Delta	1.04	3.27	Low
Ebonyi	0	6.91	None
Edo	1.87	2.42	Low
Ekiti	0.5	4.73	Low
Enugu	0.05	2.38	Low
Gombe	0	9.35	None
Imo	3	7.35	Low
Jigawa	0	9.25	None
Kaduna	8.66	4.63	Low
Kano	6.74	3.38	Low
Katsina	0.58	4.96	Low
Kebbi	0	7.07	None
Kogi	0	3.24	None
Kwara	0.43	0.54	Low
Lagos	31775.84	6.38	Very High
Nasarawa	0.1	7.52	Low
Niger	16.43	4.12	Low
Ogun	30.46	2.38	Low
Ondo	0.03	6.12	Low
Osun	29.94	4.29	Low
Oyo	5.74	2.27	Low
Plateau	0	4.73	None
Rivers	1.07	7.23	Low
Sokoto	2.5	8.69	Low
Taraba	0	2.21	None
Yobe	0	4.84	None
Zamfara	0	1.08	None

Source: BudgIT [2021]

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